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Abstract RFID is a well-known pervasive technology, which provides promising op-
portunities for the implementation of new services and for the improvement of tradi-
tional ones. However, pervasive environments require strong eorts on all the aspects
of information security. Notably, RFID passive tags are exposed to attacks, since strict
limitations aect the security techniques for this technology. A critical threat for RFID-
based information systems is represented by data tampering, which corresponds to the
malicious alteration of data recorded in the tag memory. The aim of this paper is to de-
scribe the characteristics and the eects of data tampering in RFID-based information
systems, and to survey the approaches proposed by the research community to protect
against it. The most important recent studies on privacy and security for RFID-based
systems are examined, and the protection given against tampering is evaluated. This
paper provides readers with an exhaustive overview on risks and defenses against data
tampering, highlighting RFID weak spots and open issues.
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21 Introduction
A widely employed pervasive technology is represented by Radio Frequency Identica-
tion (RFID), which is used in various sectors, e.g. supply chain management [1] and
internal traceability management [2]. A typical RFID system [3] is made up of a reader,
which generates an electromagnetic eld, and some passive tags without an own voltage
supply. They can be read only if they are in the reading range of a reader which sup-
plies the power required through a coupling unit. The RFID tags hold a memory that
stores an unambiguous identication code (ID) and potentially a rewritable user mem-
ory. RFID technology is mainly used in order to identify objects by matching them
with tags. The Automatic Identication and Data Capture (AIDC) based on RFID
provides many benets, such as time saving and great accuracy, at a reduced cost [4].
However, RFID tags are also used for other kinds of operations, such as localization,
data storing, and personal identication.
Although RFIDs provide relevant opportunities, they involve also considerable in-
formation security threats [5], such as cloning of original tags and privacy violation.
A critical threat is represented by data tampering, which consists in the malicious
changing of data recorded in the tag memory. The tampering has many dangerous
eects, such as incoherence in the information system, exposure to opponent attacks,
and mistakes in the production ow. This malicious action has been studied in various
elds, e.g. software source protection [6], and many approaches, addressing it, have
been proposed.
Nowadays, the application of RFID is rapidly growing and, according to the strict
security requirements for RFID-based systems, several research studies on RFID secu-
rity problems have been proposed (e.g. [5, 7]). According to [8] in 2007, 58 papers on
security and privacy in RFID systems, and 39 papers on controlling the information
ow between tags and readers have been proposed. Both specialized approaches [9{12]
and some more general ones [13{15] address the tampering problem. Several solutions
to various security issues in mobile [16] and pervasive technologies have been provided,
but problems as tampering in RFID still represent a critical threat for data security.
3Although various books [17, 18] and survey-based journal papers [5, 8, 19, 20] present
the state-of-the-art in RFID security, these studies are mainly focused on privacy pro-
tection, authentication features, and cryptographic hardware implementations, which
represent the most frequently analyzed RFID security issues. Therefore, this paper
aims at lling the gap in RFID security study, analyzing the characteristics of data
tampering in RFID-based information systems, and surveying the state-of-the-art of
RFID tampering protection, in order to provide readers with an exhaustive overview
on risks and on proposed defenses against tampering. The characteristics of RFID
technology are described, highlighting security weak spots. This survey is specially
focused on tampering with data in tag memories, since this threat represents a crit-
ical open issue. Furthermore, the most recent and eective general purpose security
approaches for RFID tags are analyzed, evaluating their ability to eectively protect
against tampering.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 background about
RFID is briey introduced, while in Section 3 the characteristics of data tampering are
presented with special regard to general pervasive environments and in particular to
RFID-based systems. The state-of-the-art of security approaches is described in Section
4 and in Section 5, divided according to the adopted protection features (i.e. tamper-
evidence and tamper-resistance, respectively) provided by the protocols. Finally, in
Section 6 the analyzed approaches are compared and in Section 7 some conclusions are
drawn.
2 RFID
In this section a brief introduction on RFID technology is presented, highlighting weak
spots and special requirements for RFID security techniques.
An RFID system [3], which is shown in Figure 1, typically includes an RFID reader
and some RFID tags. The reader is able to access tags by a wireless communication,
which is managed by a radio frequency interface. Furthermore, the reader communi-
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cates the collected data to a middleware, which is the software layer that allows the
interconnection between the reader and the information system.
A tag is composed by a radio frequency interface block, a memory component and
a logic element. There are two kinds of tags: passive and active. Passive tags have no
battery, and they acquire the power supply from the electromagnetic eld of the reader.
Instead, active tags have their own power supply. Passive tags are cheaper than active
ones, but they present a shorter range of transmission. The active tag life depends on
the battery duration and use, while the rewritable passive tag life is typically measured
in number of read/write cycles. The passive tags are more largely employed, thanks to
their low cost. Active tags present performance similar to other pervasive technologies,
and they are able to provide more advanced security features than passive ones, since
their own power can supply more hardware modules. Therefore, security techniques
designed for other wireless devices, such as wireless sensor networks and smart phones,
can be applied to these devices. Instead, according to the strict limitations that aect
passive tags, they require ad-hoc security techniques. The same techniques used for
passive tags could be applied also to active ones, but they have stricter limitations
than general purpose ones. Therefore, this paper is specically focused on passive tags,
and in the following, if not dierently reported, the word 'tag' is referred to passive
tags.
5The most important standardization organizations for RFID are represented by
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and EPCglobal, which dene the
physical and logical requirements and interfaces for tags and readers. Furthermore,
EPC standards dene the structure and content of data. Operational frequency used
in RFID systems vary according to the country. The frequency bands are:
{ Low Frequency (LF) between 125 and 134 KHz;
{ High Frequency (HF) at 13.56 MHz (e.g. ISO 14443 and ISO 15693, both dened
for identication cards);
{ Ultra High Frequencies (UHF) between 866 and 868 MHz in EU, between 902 and
928 MHz in USA (e.g. EPC Class I Gen 2 [21], dened for item management);
{ Microwave at 2.45 GHz in EU, between 2.4 and 2.4835 GHz and between 5.725 and
5.85 GHz in USA.
A limitation to the use of RFIDs is represented by the presence of metal or liquid that
can create noise to the electromagnetic eld, disturbing or stopping the transmission.
Lowest frequencies assure a major noise tolerance, but involve a shorter transmission
range. Another factor that aects the transmission is the antenna shape and size.
Typically, LF requires larger antennas. A reader compliant with EPC Class I Gen 2
can read RFID passive tags in a range over 4 meters. On the other hand, a small reader
for Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) compliant with ISO 14443 can read RFID passive
tags only in a range shorter than 10 cm. The RFID transmissions are characterized by
two ranges:
{ the reading range, corresponding to the area where the electromagnetic eld of the
reader induces enough voltage in the tag antenna in order to correctly receive tag
data;
{ the transmission range, corresponding to the area where the data can be received,
but the supplied voltage could be not enough for passive tags; the reader transmis-
sion range is larger than the tag transmission range, according to the higher power,
and than the reading range.
6Commonly, computational capacities are extremely limited in a tag. The major
concern of an RFID reader consists in accessing the tag memory. Memory plays an
important role in the tag architecture; it contains the unique identication number
and may have up to several kilobits of storage capacity. However, the presence of a
larger memory increases signicantly the tag cost. Tags can have read-only or read
and write memory. The rewritable memories open many application opportunities, but
they are exposed to malicious writing actions. The widely used EPC Class I Gen 2 tags
typically have a 96-bit memory bank that contains a code for the identication of the
tagged object and a 64-bit bank of reserved memory that contains passwords. On the
other hand, some ISO 14443 tags is equipped with memories larger than 8 Kbits.
The hardware or software computation of cryptographic operations requires too
computational eort for RFID tags. An RFID tag compliant with EPC Class I standard
requires between 1000 and 4000 gates, while a commercial implementation of Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) requires between 20000 and 30000 gates [22]. Since the
number of gates for security is strictly limited, usually tags implement only simple
security operations. For example, EPC Class I Gen 2 requires the use of password and
bitwise XOR operations. However, some RFID tags with cryptographic capability have
been designed, such as DEFre from Philips [23], which owns a crypto co-processor for
DES/AES operations, compliant with ISO/IEC 14443A for HF.
Each type of application requires an RFID system with specic technological char-
acteristics. In the following a list of RFID applications and their specications are
presented.
{ Supply chain management [1]. A basic application can match each item with a tag.
The tags can have small read-only memory with a unique code. Their frequency is
UHF, in order to have a long reading range, and they are typically compliant with
EPC standards.
{ Internal traceability management based on reusable containers [2]. Each tag is
matched to a container and the data about the products, written in the tag memory,
are repeatedly updated. These applications require tags with rewritable memory in
7order to update the information. The frequency of the tag is HF, normally matched
to a large memory, or UHF, providing a larger reading range.
{ RFID applications for libraries [24]. Each tag is matched to a book, and it contains
information about the book and its location. These systems are often based on tags
with rewritable memories, so the stored data can be updated and new ones can be
added. The tags are normally read by a PDA, so the short reading range provided
by HF does not represent a limitation.
The pervasive nature of RFID technology exposes tags to two kinds of possible
accesses:
{ physical access, when an entity gets in touch with the tag;
{ RF communication access, by means of the tag communication protocol, potentially
without knowledge of the owner of the tag.
The rst case seems more dangerous, since adversaries have time and means to
perform strong attacks. However, the possible damages due to tampering actions are
limited, since hardly they can be performed without knowledge of the tag owner. In-
stead, RF attacks can generate troubles, since adversaries could alter data on rewritable
memory tags that will be reused, generating possible mistakes.
As a conclusion, the main elements that aect RFID security techniques for tags
are:
{ low computational eort;
{ limited memory;
{ exposure to RF access by hidden readers.
The strict limitations related to tags do not aect the reader and the middleware,
which can implement normal security techniques.
3 Tampering in Pervasive Information Systems
The denition of tampering changes according to the context. It can be dened as a
malicious action that alters something (e.g. objects or data). Several elds in Informa-
8tion Technology are subject to the tampering problem, so many eective defenses have
been proposed [25{31]. There are two kinds of protections against tampering.
{ Tamper-evidence. The feature of a process, device, or software, to detect the exis-
tence of tampering.
{ Tamper-resistance. The ability to resist to tampering.
The eects of tampering can be divided in two main groups:
{ damage, when tampering makes something unusable;
{ alteration, when the target seems correct, but according to the malicious alteration,
it is faulty and it will generate possible mistakes.
Although tamper-resistance solutions aim at preventing all tampering eects, tamper-
evidence aims at preventing only mistakes due to an alteration, reduced to a damage. In
the following the main tampering eects and tamper-protection schemes from several
elds are introduced, describing their relation with RFID.
One eld in information technology, where the tampering problem has been widely
studied, is the software protection. A tamper attack could alter a program in some
ways. An adopted solution is adding tamper-evident features, by inserting into the
program tamper-proong code, which can detect if the program was tampered with,
stopping the program when tampering eects are detected [6]. This kind of attack could
be very dangerous for pervasive devices, since they are often deployed into hostile areas.
However, low cost RFID tags are very simple devices and most of them do not present
a microprocessor, so software tampering does not represent a relevant threat.
A considerable tampering subject is the hardware tampering. Tampering actions
may aim at damaging the device or at altering the system accessing to the code in
order to reprogram it with a malicious one able to execute insider attacks. The tamper-
resistant hardware may avoid unauthorized access to the running code and it may resist
to malicious actions such as physical penetration, and temperature manipulation. Var-
ious applications employ tamper-resistant hardware, among which several approaches
for authentication and integrity checking in mobile systems [25]. However, the use of
9tamper-resistant hardware requires high costs, which are often too expensive for per-
vasive environments. In wireless sensor networks a tampered node with a malicious
running program is a critical threat. Hardware tampering attacks to RFID tags have
not been reported, and it is not yet directly handled by RFID security approaches for
low cost RFID tags. The main motivation is that tags are often vulnerable to simpler
and faster RF attacks, which can be applied also without physical access.
In wireless communications, tamper attacks could modify in-transit packets, so
received data are altered and dier from the transmitted ones. This malicious action is
recognized as really dangerous especially in mobile elds, such as Vehicular [26], and
Mobile [27] Ad-Hoc Networks.
The greatest threat for RFID Information System is represented by data tamper-
ing. The most well-known data tampering attacks control data, and the main defense
against it is the control ow monitoring for reaching tamper-evidence. However, tam-
pering with other kinds of data such as user identity data, conguration data, user input
data, and decision-making data, is also dangerous [28]. Some solutions were proposed,
such as a tamper-evident compiler and micro-architecture collaboration framework to
detect memory tampering [29]. A further threat is the tampering with application
data, involving mistakes in the production ow, denial of service, incoherence in the
information system, and exposure to opponent attacks. This kind of attack is especially
dangerous for RFID systems, since one of the main RFID applications is the automatic
identication for database real-time updating. The main data tampering actions are:
{ data impairing, some bits of digital information are changed, in order to damage it
making data unreadable or to alterate its value;
{ wrong data insertion, data are altered replacing them with new data with erroneous
values; this action requires the ability to compose new data consistent with the
original data encoding;
{ data copying, original data are altered deleting and replacing them with other data
copied from a dierent location; this action does not require an encoding process.
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In a RFID-based system, data tampering is very dangerous, since it could generate
serious mistakes, e.g. in a company with AIDC the production ow could be stopped,
and in pharmaceutical industry [30], drugs with wrong data may be delivered to a
wrong destination, causing troubles for patients.
Data tampering can be performed on RFID tags with a rewritable memory, by
means of a RF communication. According to the pervasive deployment of tags, an
attack can be performed moving the adversary RFID reader for few seconds inside the
reading range of the tag, or viceversa waiting until the tag is moved in the reading range
of the hidden adversary RFID reader. For tags with a read-only memory, tampering
attacks cannot be performed by means of a RF communication, so the physical access
to the tag is required in order to perform the more costly hardware tampering.
An evaluation of threats on RFID systems compliant with EPC standards has been
presented in [32]. This study, partially based on an evaluation framework proposed by
ETSI [33], determines the likelihood of a threat, which represents the probability that
an attack is performed, according to the motivation, which is evaluated according to
the provided benets, and the required diculty for attackers. Finally the evaluation
method ranks the risk of a threat as \critical", \major" or \possible", according to the
computed likelihood and the impact, which represents the relevance of the attack eects.
This study has been extended in [34], where the threats contained in the STRIDE
model [35], which is used to dene threat types for the design of secure software systems,
are evaluated according to the proposed method. However, only a limited part of the
study is focused on tampering, and the analysis deals only with systems compliant
with EPC standards, which are designed for item management. The motivation for
tampering with RFID data has been ranked medium, since adversaries do not reach
clear benets. The diculty has been ranked high, since adversaries have to bypass
32-bit passwords, according to EPC Class I Gen 2 [21]. The impact has been ranked
low, since the tampering eects are evaluated temporary. The resulting likelihood and
risk have been evaluated low. However, according to our analysis, when the motivation
is to damage a competitor it can be ranked high. Moreover, tampering actions can be
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performed for economic purposes, e.g. changing the price of a good in a shop. Many
RFID tags are not protected by passwords, and often eavesdropping the passwords
could be simple, as detailed in Section 5.3, so the diculty is medium. When the eect
is an alteration the impact could be medium or high. The likelihood in our analysis is
considered medium and the risk is evaluated medium/high.
4 Tamper-evident approaches
In this section the approaches that aim at detecting tampering are detailed. These
schemes aim at reducing the alteration eects of tampering to a damage. According to
the evaluation method presented in [32], the result is the reduction of the impact and of
the risk from medium/high to low. Even if data tampering can be performed not only
on the data stored in the tag memory, it represents the weak spot of RFID systems,
so this section is focused on tampering with data on tags. Other attacks conducted
beyond the RFID reader, such as tampering with database or messages between the
RFID reader and servers, can be managed by well-known security techniques (e.g.
Tamper-Evident Database [31] and Message Authentication Code (MAC) [36]). The
described approaches are shown in Figure 2.
4.1 Fragile watermarking for RFID data tamper detection
The watermarking consists in embedding information into original data. It is dened
fragile when a minimal change of the original data generates incoherence between the
data and the embedded information.
A tamper detection system based on fragile watermarking was proposed in [9]. This
system aims at detecting tampering on RFID tag with a writable memory compliant
with EPC96 standard, as shown in Fig 3. The tag memory is composed by the following
elds:
{ the Header that denes the EPC version,
{ the EPC Manager that identies the manufacturer,
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{ the Object Class that identies the kind of object,
{ the Serial Number that is used by the manufacturer to unambiguously identify the
tagged item.
Since the format of the rst three data elds is set by the standard but the serial number
is directly managed by the companies, the authors propose to embed the watermark
into the serial number. The fragile watermark is reached by performing 3 one-way
functions respectively on the EPC Manager, the Object Class, and the original Serial
Number. The check of the watermark requires the knowledge of its location inside
the EPC, and the adopted one-way functions, so these data shall be shared by the
partners that aim to guarantee the authenticity of the information by adopting the
described approach. This system allows detecting tampering on the EPC Manager, the
Object Class, and the original Serial Number. When tampering actions are detected,
the system detects the tampered area with a discrimination of one among the three
data, and the watermark.
In [10], an implementation of the system described in [9] is proposed. The water-
mark requires 8 bits out of the 32 bits of the Serial Number, and it is generated as a
hash number by the EPC Manager, and the Object Class, through a pseudo random
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Fig. 3 Standard EPC96: Tag Memory Organization
number generator. The function is not applied on the Serial Number, since tampering
actions on it are not considered dangerous by the authors. One additional bit from the
Serial Number is required as parity bit of the watermark.
The authors conclude that the short length of the watermark could aect the
robustness of the tamper detection system, but this problem could be avoided by
adding an additional memory area for the watermark.
A drawback of this implementation is that the watermarking is based on a secret
function. Therefore, when an opponent obtains the function a huge modication of the
system is required.
This system can be applied only to RFID tags that hold data compliant with
EPC96. However, it could be easily extended to other standards. The RFID tags do
not require special features. The communication protocols between the reader and tags
have no special requirements. When the reader receives a writing request, it shall be
able to generate the watermark and to embed it into the original data. The middleware
is in charge of managing the checking protocol. The time required by the tamper check
corresponds to the reading of 96 bits, and to the computation of the watermarking
function.
The robustness of the system is based on the secrecy of the adopted function,
and of the location of the watermark. However, this information shall be shared by
all the entities involved in the trade of the tagged products, so the application of
this system requires strong trust among participants. The system does not involve
participants with limited permissions, e.g. the only tamper checking ability, so the
method is vulnerable to insider attack, since a malicious participant can sabotage the
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whole system. Furthermore, external companies or customers that want to buy the
products cannot directly use the system in order to detect tampering.
According to the implementation proposed in [10], data impairing performed by an
opponent that does not know the secret function and the location of the watermark
is undetected only if performed on the bits of the original Serial Number. When the
opponent knows the location of the watermark, it can impair all the bits of the original
Serial Number. This action, else if limited to the Serial Number, can seriously damage
some services, such as traceability management. As data impairing, also wrong data
insertion can be performed only on the bits of the original Serial Number. However, the
knowledge of the Serial Number format adopted by a company makes easier to nd the
location of the watermark. This malicious action can more eectively damage services,
since its consequences are deterministic. The data copying can be performed on the
whole tag memory also without knowledge on the functions and on the location of the
watermark, since by copying both the original data and the watermark no incoherence
is generated. This action triggers critical troubles, since all the data can be altered, and
when performed on RFID tags for item management, it can generate various mistakes.
This scheme can be used both to detect tampering with tag memories that do
not present any other protections (e.g. password), and as additional protection. The
application of the system, according to the restriction to EPC compliant tags, is almost
limited to item management systems. The extension to other tag types and RFID
systems is also possible. The strength of this scheme is that it is compliant with RFID
tag limitations, because no additional computation eort is charged on tags, and no
additional memory is required. However, the provided protection against tampering
is limited. The introduction of watermarking can defend against random tampering
attacks performed to the purpose of impair generic tags, but it is weak against an
adversary with proper means.
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4.2 Write activity record for RFID data tamper detection
Yamamoto et al. have proposed a method for tamper detection based on write activity
record [11]. In this approach the RFID tag has a special memory area that RFID
readers can only read, and that the tag itself can read and write. When a writing
operation is performed on the tag memory by a reader, the tag writes a record that
describes the operation in the special memory area. A writing operation is described
by the oset of the written memory area, and by the length of the written data. The
rst information in the special memory area represents the pointer to the area for the
next insertion, and the number of recorded writing operations.
The tamper detection method requires the check of the records in the special mem-
ory area, in order to check if some data have been overwritten on previous data. If
there is no overlap, then the memory has not been tampered. Otherwise if some mem-
ory areas have been overwritten, then data could be tampered.
The authors have proposed and tested an implementation that requires 2 bytes for
each record of the special memory area. Therefore, the special memory area shall be
very large, in order to hold more than one record for each memory bank. Furthermore,
the protocol should be able to manage eectively a number of writing operations greater
than the number of records in the special memory area, in order to avoid that several
writing operations on the same bank could hide tampering on other banks.
The tamper detection can be performed without special permissions, so every com-
pany or customer can check if tags have been tampered.
This system can be applied to RFID tags, regardless of their data organization
and format. The RFID tags require an additional special memory area, and a special
writing protocol. The middleware shall manage the checking protocol; while, the com-
munication protocol and the RFID reader do not present special requirements. The
time required by the tamper check corresponds mainly to the reading of memory slots
of 2 bytes for each performed writing. This overhead corresponds to a drawback in
many critical and real-time applications.
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This approach allows detecting all the tampering actions, but it detects as possible
tampering also each rewriting operation. Therefore, it is not suitable for an Informa-
tion System that uses the same memory area more than once, e.g. internal traceability
systems based on reusable containers [4]. Furthermore, applications that allow opera-
tors to correct writing operations of wrong data, by writing the correct information on
the same memory bank, will generate several false tamper detections, according to the
error rate of human operators. The suitability of the system requires that the number
of false detections should be very small. Another drawback of the system is that only
tampering with written memory banks can be detected, but wrong data insertion and
data copying on unused banks cannot be detected.
This approach requires the design of new tags, currently not available, which would
be compliant with existing standards. The main drawbacks of this approach are the
large memory requirement, the long transmission time for tamper checking, and the
limited applicability. However for some applications where a high cost per tag is ac-
ceptable, it can provide a good security against data tampering attacks performed by
RF channel.
4.3 Public key cryptography for authentication
Various protocols for authentication employ cryptography and RFID tags without
cryptographic capability. In these approaches the cryptographic operations are not
performed by the tag, which only contains the encrypted data. Typically, a critical
code is encrypted using a secret key and a public key cryptosystem in order to get a
signature. The public key is given to all the entities that have to check the authenticity
of the product matched with the tag. The authenticity checking requires the decryption
of the signature, and the comparison with the original code.
An authentication approach based on RSA was proposed in [13]. In this approach
the ID of the tag is encrypted and written in the user memory. The authenticity
checking corresponds to the decryption of the number in the user memory. When
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the result does not correspond to the ID, the tag and the corresponding product are
considered false.
An authenticity check on a tag, where some bits of the signature have been im-
paired, recognizes the tag and the product as false. An opponent cannot insert wrong
data, since this action requires the knowledge of the secret key. The copying of the
signature from other tags generates false tags, so it is equivalent to the data impair-
ing. The tamper detection can be performed only by the authenticity check, but this
operation cannot distinguish between a not authentic tag written by an adversary and
an original tag written by the competent entity and tampered by an attacker.
Authentication protocols can provide tamper-evidence, but they require tags with
a large memory and long data transmissions. Furthermore, it is not possible to distin-
guish if a tag is not original or it has been tampered, and the tamper-evidence is not
extended to other information contained by the tag. Therefore, authentication schemes
based on public key cryptography for RFID tags without cryptographic capability are
not eective tamper-evident approaches. The damaging eects due to false positives
generates a medium/high impact according to the importance of the authentication,
so tags with additional tamper-resistant features are required in order to reach a high
diculty for attackers and to reduce the risk from medium/high to low.
4.4 Cryptography for privacy protection
Many applications uses secret or private information, employing RFID tags without
cryptographic capability that contain secret or private information. A possible solution
to avoid unauthorized readings of the recorded data is represented by the encryption.
In a symmetric cryptosystem, all the participants own the key, so they can perform
both encryption and decryption. However, this system requires a strong trust among
the participants, since the robustness of the system is based on the secrecy of the key.
Another approach is to employ Public key cryptography. Two alternative meth-
ods have been presented in [15]. These methods aim at providing food traceability
with privacy protection. They involve a competent authority (i.e. the same authority
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that monitors food traceability) that supervises the security mechanism. In the former
method, the information are reserved to the competent authority, which generates the
keys employed in the system. Each company encrypts its data by using a public key
deployed by the authority. In order to improve the security, the ciphertexts are nested.
Each company attaches its information to the encrypted data written by the previous
company on the RFID tag, and it encrypts the resulting text by using a key with
the same length of the new plaintext (corresponding to the length of the previous key
increased by the length of the new data). Only the authority owns the secret keys, so
companies and customers cannot read the data. In the latter method, also the com-
panies generate a couple of keys, and they give the public key to the authorities. The
information is encrypted by companies using both the authority-public key and the
company-private key, in order to guarantee both the privacy and the authenticity of
the information.
Another interesting protocol is Insubvertible Encryption [14], which aims at pro-
tecting privacy, and employs a public-key cryptosystem based on ElGamal encryp-
tion [37] for privacy protection. In this scheme the data written in the tag memory are
encrypted and can be re-encrypted by an authorized user without knowledge on the
keys previously used. The scope of the re-encryption is to change the context of the
tag in order to avoid tracking. This scheme is tamper-evident, since the entity that
performs the re-encryption can identify if the ciphertext has been tampered.
In cryptosystems that manage also the authenticity, as described in Section 4.3, the
tamper detection can be performed only by the authenticity check, but this operation
cannot normally distinguish between a not authentic tag and a tampered one. Instead,
in cryptosystems that encrypt information only for privacy, data impairing is detected
by decryption, so only authorized entities can check it. Wrong data insertion is possible
only for opponents with the secret key. The data copying of the whole memory can
be performed avoiding detection only when the protocol does not encrypt a reference
information, that unambiguously identies the item or the tag. However, only systems
where tags are not suspected to be not authentic are eectively tamper-evident.
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5 Tamper-resistant approaches
In this section one approach specically designed for tamper-resistant RFID tag is
detailed. Furthermore, some security tamper-resistant general purpose approaches are
described. A classication of tamper-resistant approaches is shown in Figure 4. Ac-
cording to the evaluation method presented in [32], these schemes aim at increasing
the diculty for adversaries to tamper with data in tag memories.
5.1 Steganography for RFID tag data recovery
The steganography is the ability to hide information. In [12] an approach based on
steganography that aims at recovering tampered data on RFID tag memories compliant
with EPC96 is presented.
According to the approaches described in Sec. 4.1, the approach proposed in [12]
is based on the statement that opponents could get benets only by tampering with
the EPC Manager and Object Class, and that the Serial Number is the best area to
embed security bits.
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Authors propose to select a group of products of the same consignment that are
characterized by the same EPC Manager and Object Class, to split in groups of bits
the secret pattern generated from the EPC Manager and the Object Class of the tags,
and to embed each group of bits in the Serial Number of a tag. The secret pattern
is computed using error correction codes, and its length is equal to the sum of the
lengths of the EPC Manager, the Object Class, and some bits required by the formula.
Error correction codes help to recover data, when also the Serial Number has been
tampered. Authors propose an implementation where the length of the pattern is 66
bits. Therefore, these 66 bits are devised in groups, and each group is embedded in a
tag memory. Then for each group it calculates the parity bit, which is embedded in
the Serial Number of the subsequent tag. The tamper detection and recover procedure
consists in checking the parity bit, and performing the error correction coding. The
parity bit aims at detecting tamper with the Serial Number, and the secret pattern is
used to generate the original EPC Manager and Object Class. Also when few bits of
the secret pattern have been tampered, the error correction coding can calculate the
right original data.
This system can be applied only to RFID tags that hold data compliant with
EPC96. The RFID tags do not require special features. The protocols of communication
between the reader and tags are compliant with standards. Writing operation shall be
managed according to the group division of the tags, in order to embed correctly the
security bits. The middleware is in charge of the checking protocol. The time required
by the tamper checking and recovery, which may be performed on a whole group of
tags, corresponds to the reading of 96 bits for each tag, and to the computation of the
error correction coding.
The system can be applied only to indivisible set of products, since the lack of
some tags makes the recovery system unusable, and the tamper detection possible only
when both a tag and the subsequent one are available. The robustness of the system
is based on the secrecy of the location of the secret information and on the error
correction coding. However, this information shall be shared by all the entities that are
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involved in the trade of the tagged products; so the application of this system requires
strong trust among participants. The system does not involve participants with limited
permissions, so a malicious participant can sabotage the whole system. Furthermore,
external companies and customers that want to buy the products cannot directly use
the system in order to detect tampering.
As for tamper detection approaches described in Sec. 4.1, data impairing performed
by an opponent that does not know the secret function and the location of the secret
pattern is undetectable only if performed on the bits of the original Serial Number.
When the opponent knows the location of the secret pattern, he/she can impair all the
bits of the original Serial Number. When the data impairing alters too many bits of
the secret pattern, the recovery cannot be performed. As data impairing, also wrong
data insertion can be performed avoiding detection only when performed on the bits
of the original Serial Number. However, opponents that know the meaning of data in
the Serial Number can easily nd the secret pattern. Since the system shall be applied
to groups of products of the same set, the data copying of the whole tag memory can
be easily detected. However, the copy of all the data of a group of tags, on a dierent
group cannot be detected by this approach.
This scheme can be used to recover tampered data on tag memories that have no
other protections (e.g. access password), or as additional protection. The application
of the system, according to the restriction to EPC compliant tags, is generally limited
to item management systems. The application restriction to indivisible groups of items
and the low protection level strictly limits the applicability of this scheme.
5.2 Unwritable Memory
RFID tags with unwritable memory are tamper-resistant. They can be divided in two
groups according to the memory characteristics:
{ read-only memory, as the memories that hold only the ID;
{ permanently lockable memory, such as in the EPC Class I Gen 2 Standard [21],
where after being locked with a password the memory becomes unlockable.
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A great benet of systems that employ these kinds of tags is the strong tamper-
resistance. Although these RFID tags cannot be used for applications which require the
ability to record information on the tags (e.g. internal tracking with reusable contain-
ers [2,38]), when they are applicable (e.g. supply chain management [1]) they represent
the strongest solution. Also for authentication systems, unwritable memory are an ef-
fective solution, especially when the tag memory contains a signature. Tags with a
permanently lockable memory are more versatile than tags with a read only memory,
and if the locking is correctly managed, they provide the same tamper-resistant level.
5.3 Passwords
A basic protocol that authenticates readers can employ passwords. In this case a reader
needs the correct password in order to access to the tag memory. However, an eaves-
dropper can listen the password and use it for unauthorized accesses to the tag. The
optional use of 32-bit passwords is required by EPC Class I Gen 2 [21]. When a pass-
word is used to write into memory area, the tag sends a random number to the reader,
which performs a bitwise XOR operation between the password and the random num-
ber, and then it sends the result to the tag. An adversary that can only eavesdrop reader
to tag communication, but not the other direction, is not able to nd the password.
However, an adversary that can eavesdrop both the directions of the communication
can easily nd it.
The strength of passwords is that they are easy to implement, and they are also
managed by low cost tags. However, the simple use of password increases the diculty
for adversaries to tamper with RFID data, since this action requires eavesdropping,
but does not stop it. Furthermore, the use of password cannot be applied to systems
where generic users have the writing privilege.
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5.4 Challenge-Response Protocols
In a challenge-response authentication protocol an entity presents a question, and a
second entity properly answers. When the answer is incorrect the second entity is
considered not valid. The authentication can be unilateral or mutual. Several methods
that implement challenge-response authentication can be applied to RFID technology.
Advanced protocols employ cryptography [39]. An example that employs symmetric
key encryption, unilateral authentication, and random number, can be based on ISO/
IEC 9798-2 [40]. Both the tag and the reader own the secret key. The tag sends a random
number to the reader, which encrypts it using the secret key and which sends back the
ciphertext. The described protocol requires tags with enough computation capacity to
perform symmetric-key encryption and to generate random or suitable pseudo-random
numbers. The robustness of the protocol is related to the diculty to predict the
pseudo-random number and to the length and the security of the employed keys. An
example of RFID tags with cryptographic capability is DEFre from Philips [23], which
can perform AES/DES operations.
The only ways to tamper with data on a tag that employs a challenge-response
authentication protocol based on symmetric key encryption are breaking the encryp-
tion scheme, nding the secret keys or predicting/altering the pseudo-random number
generation. When the employed cryptosystem is strong enough, challenge-response pro-
tocols represent a strong solution. Moreover, they can be employed for applications that
require rewritable memories, provided that only authorized users have to write on the
tags. However, the main drawback is the additional cryptographic modulo required by
tags, which increases the cost per tag, and can reduce the reading range, according to
the higher power supply required by the tag.
6 Discussion
During the last years, many approaches have been proposed for security problems
aiming at protecting from tampering, and in particular various tamper-evident and
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Table 1 Requirements Comparison of Anti-Tampering Approaches respect to EPC Class I
Gen 2 Standard
Approach Requirements
tags readers/
middleware
communication
Watermarking [10] standard (EPC96) watermark
generation
standard
Write activity [11] special memory area standard standard
special writing protocol
Authentication [13] standard (large user
memory)
standard/
encryption
standard
Privacy protection [15] standard (large user
memory)
standard/
encryption
standard
Steganography [12] standard (EPC96) standard standard
Permanently lockable
memory [21]
standard (lockable) standard standard
Password [21] standard (password) standard standard
Challenge-Response
Authentication [23]
encryption standard/
encryption
Challenge-
Response
tamper-resistant approaches have been proposed for RFID tags. These approaches
are characterized by dierent properties, requirements, and applications. Furthermore,
each approach has specic benets and drawbacks.
In order to analyze the feasibility of anti-tampering approaches, their requirements
have to be considered. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of RFID tags, read-
ers and communications protocols that are required by anti-tampering approaches.
The compared authentication and privacy protection approaches are based on mes-
sages encrypted with public key cryptography and embedded in the tag memory. The
requirements for the readers and the middleware are the easiest to satisfy, adding
additional software modules to the middleware, or implementing their functionalities
directly on the reader, also when these modules require relevant computational eort.
Requirements that modify the communication standards often involve longer communi-
cation sessions and generate incompatibility with standard devices. However, the only
approach that has special requirements for communication is the Challenge-Response
Authentication, which is naturally limited to authorized tags and readers. Each ap-
proach presents some requirements for RFID tags, which are the most dicult to
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Table 2 Protection Comparison of Anti-Tampering Approaches
Approach Tampering Threats
data impairing wrong data insertion data copying
Watermarking [10] tamper-evident1 tamper-evident1 possible
Write activity [11] tamper-evident2 tamper-evident2 tamper-evident2
Authentication [13] possible possible possible
Privacy protec-
tion [15]
tamper-evident tamper-evident possible
Steganography [12] tamper-evident1 tamper-evident1 possible
light resistance light resistance light resistance
Permanently lock-
able memory [21]
tamper-resistant tamper-resistant tamper-resistant
Password [21] tamper-resistant tamper-resistant tamper-resistant
Challenge-Response
Authentication [23]
tamper-resistant tamper-resistant tamper-resistant
1 According to the analyzed implementation tampering with the original Serial Num-
ber cannot be detected.
2 Tampering with blank memory banks cannot be detected.
satisfy. The Challenge-Response Authentication and the Write activity scheme present
requirements not addressed by the standards, which involve high cost tags with ad-
ditional hardware modules. Authentication and privacy protection approaches require
large user memories, increasing the cost. The tag requirements of the other schemes
can be accomplished without excessive eort.
Table 2 compares the protection against data-tampering threats of both approaches
designed for tampering, and general security approaches. One implementation for each
approach is used as reference in the table. A tamper threat is dened as \possible"
when the requirements of the approach are satised and it can still be performed. The
denition \light resistance" is used when tampering can be performed, and the data
recovery could be possible. Observing Table 2, we can nd that only one method is
tamper-evident against data copying, but only for tampering with written memory
banks, so the protection from this attack represents a relevant open issue for RFID
tamper-evident research studies. Examining the general purpose security techniques,
we can nd that although tag authentication protocols do not provide any eective pro-
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Table 3 Robustness Comparison of Anti-Tampering Approaches
Approach Robustness Factors RFID Drawbacks
length of the watermark area in the EPC code
Watermarking [10] function secrecy dicult updating
watermark location secrecy
participant trust insider vulnerable
Write activity [11] no rewritings tampering and rewriting
unnoticeable
special memory length memory area
Privacy protection [15] length of the keys memory area and transmis-
sion time
key secrecy
length of the code area in the EPC code
Steganography [12] error correction coding multiple tags
watermark location secrecy
participant trust insider vulnerable
Permanently lockable
memory [21]
hardware
password secrecy eavesdropper vulnerable
Password [21] password length memory area
password number memory area
Challenge-Response length of the keys tag computation
Authentication [23] key secrecy
tection against tampering, privacy protection systems present eective tamper-evident
features.
A critical characteristic for the evaluation of an approach is represented by its ro-
bustness, since a protocol that protects against all tamper threats but can be easily
broken is not acceptable. Table 3 shows the main factors that aect the robustness
of a method, and the related drawbacks due to RFID technology, such as additional
memory area, which increases the cost, and additional computation, which increases the
time and consumption. The most robust tamper-evident approach is represented by the
Write activity scheme. However, it requires a large memory to store the writing activ-
ities. The tamper-evidence provided by the privacy protection approach is quite high,
but it does not address data copying, and it requires a large memory. The robustness of
the Watermarking scheme is lower, mainly because it is based on several factors, such
as the length of the watermark and the trust among participants, which are not easy
to fully satisfy. The most robust tamper-evident approach is the Permanently lockable
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Table 4 Tamper Checking Comparison of Tamper-evident Approaches
Approach Detection Ability Owner Checking Time
Watermarking [10] participants 96-bit reading
watermarking function
Write activity [11] public reading of 2 bytes for per-
formed writing
Privacy protection [15] authority whole ciphertext reading
decryption
memory, since it is protected against RF attacks. Also the Challenge-Response Authen-
tication is robust, but it requires relevant tag computation capability. The Password
approach is exposed to brute force attacks, which are addressed by long passwords,
and to eavesdropping attacks, which represents the weak spot of this approach. The
Steganography approach does not provide high robustness, since tampering with the
watermark location prevents data recovery.
Table 4 shows the characteristics of tamper checking. The number of entities that
can check the tamper presence aects the usefulness of the system, since a restricted
number of possible users lead to diculties to detect tampering. Also the number and
the kind of operations is important, since they aect the performance of the system.
However, as shown in Table 4, the RFID-specic tamper-evident approaches do not re-
quire too long operations, so they are quite fast; instead, the general privacy protection
approach, which involves cryptography, requires more computation time.
Table 5 shows the tamper-evident approaches sorted according to their robustness,
and the restrictions to their applicability. According to the decrease of the robustness,
the schemes can be more widely applied. The Write activity scheme can be used only
for applications that do not require more than one writing operation per memory bank
(e.g. supply chain management). Privacy protection can be used for every type of
application, but it requires that all the participants own the keys. The Watermarking
scheme can be used for applications that employ tags compliant with EPC96 standard,
which is normally used for item management.
For applications that do not require rewriting the Write activity approach is the
best solution. However, it requires expensive tags. For applications that require rewrit-
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Table 5 Applicability Comparison of Tamper-evident Approaches
# Approach Applicability Restrictions
1 Write activity [11] No corrections or updates
2 Privacy protection [15] Participants with keys
3 Watermarking [10] EPC96 data format
ing, and only authorized users have to access tags, a good tamper-evident solution is
represented by the Privacy protection approach. However, also this approach requires
quite expensive tags. For the other applications where data are compliant with EPC96,
or when the tag cost is a critical parameter, the Watermarking approach can represent
a good solution. However, the provided tamper-evidence is limited.
Although tamper-evident approaches reduce the alteration eects of tampering to
damage, according to Section 3, tamper-resistant approaches can provide better pro-
tection against both alteration and damage. Table 6 shows the tamper-resistant ap-
proaches sorted according to their robustness, and the restrictions to their applicability.
As for tamper-evident schemes, according to the decrease of the robustness, they can
be more widely applied. The Permanently lockable memory approach can be used only
for applications that do not require rewriting, similarly to the Write activity approach.
The Challenge-Response Authentication and the Password schemes can be used for
every type of application, but they require that the participants with writing privilege
own the keys or passwords. The Steganography approach can be used for applications
that employ tags compliant with EPC96 standard, as the Watermarking approach.
For applications that do not require rewriting the Permanently lockable memory
approach is the best solution. Moreover, it can be implemented with low cost tags.
Therefore, for these application the Permanently lockable memory approach is better
than theWrite activity scheme. For applications that require rewriting, and where only
authorized users have to write tags, the Challenge-Response Authentication can be a
good solution. However, this approach requires very expensive tags. When low cost
tags are required, the same kind of applications managed with the Challenge-Response
Authentication can employ the Password approach, but they provide less security,
being exposed to eavesdropping. In order to reach a higher security the Password
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Table 6 Applicability Comparison of Tamper-resistant Approaches
# Approach Applicability Restrictions
1 Permanently lockable memory [21] No corrections or updates
2 Challenge-Response Authentication [23] Participants with keys
3 Password [21] Participants with password
4 Steganography [12] EPC96 format, Inseparble tags
approach can be used together with Privacy protection. For the other applications
where data are compliant with EPC96, or when the tag cost is a critical parameter,
the Steganography scheme can represent a solution, but only if inseparable set of tags
are used. This approach provides low tamper-resistance, but it provides also limited
tamper-evidence.
The main open issues for tamper-resistant solutions are represented by the lack
of cheap and robust schemes applicable to tags with rewritable memory. Tamper-
evident approaches lack of robust schemes based on low cost tags, and the lack of
schemes usable for a generic application. Especially data copying requires to be carefully
managed by future tamper-evident approaches. Watermarking-based schemes seem a
quite eective low cost solution, but it should be extended to tags with dierent memory
organizations.
7 Conclusion
Tampering is one of the most dangerous threats for RFID systems, especially data-
tampering, which cannot easily be addressed with standard methods. In this paper the
characteristics and the eects of tampering have been described. The peculiarities of
tampering with RFIDs and in general with pervasive technologies have been detailed.
Tamper-evident and tamper-resistant approaches for RFID have been surveyed and
classied. Furthermore, other general purpose RFID security techniques have been
described, analyzing their protection against tampering attacks.
The comparison of the described approaches highlighted their benets and draw-
backs. Among the various approaches the main protection is given by the tamper-
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resistant general purpose ones, but these methods involve either strict limitations to
RFID applications, or RFID tag computational capacity. The RFID-specic tamper-
evident approaches do not require relevant computational capacity, but either their
robustness is limited or their applicability is narrow. The main open issue is repre-
sented by the lack of tamper-evident approaches that are able to eectively manage
data copying.
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